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Smith: "Rough Justice," "Fairness," and the Process of Environmental Med

"ROUGH JUSTICE," "FAIRNESS," AND THE
PROCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION*
Diane R. SmithMartin Luther King said: "We must all live together [as rational
human beings], or perish together as fools."' Well, with respect to
environmental disputes, we are learning to live together as rational
human beings, and we are doing it primarily through mediation. We are
finding ways to eliminate or minimize litigation costs in what are almost
invariably multi-party disputes, whose costs have staggered involved
parties for two decades. As a result of this rational behavior, we are also
able to utilize our collective intelligence to minimize collective damages.
The process of learning to live together as rational human beings
necessarily involves reaching a consensus of how our disputes will be
resolved, what a satisfactory settlement must look like, and how to
assure that our agreements with respect to resolution are actually
implemented.
From the parties' standpoint, rational behavior can be difficult to
achieve; but, rational behavior is particularly essential in environmental
disputes because of the pervasive presence of that all-powerful party or
power -- the government. In most other types of disputes, the parties are
familiar with and have a basic respect for the liability theories involved,
such as fault or negligence. Even if they disagree with the result of the
application of such theories or with the level of damages assessed, they
understand the rationale behind the liability. No such familiar basis for
liability exists in environmental disputes because of the strict liability
and/or joint and several liability aspects of the vast majority of
environmental statutes and the power of the government to take action
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when the parties fail to take action. Someone once wisely pointed out,
however, that the best way to escape from a problem is to solve it.
Nothing is more true with respect to environmental disputes.
Environmental mediators are often much like Harry Truman, who
said, "I never give them hell. I just tell the truth, and they think it is
hell." 2 Often, the "hell" of environmental disputes involves the fact that,
in the final analysis, the question is not "am I liable."
Rather, the
questions usually are: "how much am I liable for?"; "what are our
collective damages?"; and, "how can we resolve this without the process
of dispute resolution raising the cost of the problem itself, or even
interfering with our ability to address the problem?"
I. THE NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC POLICY DISPUTES
Environmental disputes are often multiparty disputes and are almost
invariably complex and expensive.
They frequently involve
controversies and concern about the effect of contaminants on
populations of humans other than those engaged in the dispute and
about the fate or well-being of resources, which significant segments of
the population consider to be public assets. Parties to such disputes can,
and often do, include the public at large, one or more layers of
government, as well as nearby or adjoining property owners. The
traditional "parties" do not have complete control of how the condition
underlying the dispute will be addressed.
Environmental issues can impact health and safety and property
values for a wide range of persons. Resolution of underlying issues
often requires expenditures far beyond the experience or ability of many
of the parties. At times, the issues at stake are so financially, politically,
and publicly charged that they are difficult to resolve through any means
other than a third party decision-maker (judge, jury, or arbitrator) or the
use of force or power. The traditional source of a third party decision in
environmental disputes is recourse to the courts; and, the most usual
source of a decision based on force or power is a regulatory agency or
court demand, requirement or order.
Recourse to courts or to agencies takes control out of the hands of the
parties. Using a third party decision-maker leaves parties open to
unpredictability and a decision that may result in unbearable harm to a
party's interest or, at least, a far more devastating loss than a

2

Id. at 704.
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compromise would have caused. Relying on the courts or agencies for
resolution of environmental disputes involves tremendous risks for the
parties and can destroy the possibility of cost-effective, cooperative
relationships among those most seriously affected by the underlying
dispute. Litigation, or "proving up" on one's adversary, is not welladvised in the "joint and several" arena of environmental law. The
interests of the parties are better served by reaching a consensus rather
than reaching for a decision-maker.
Because of the inevitable power player, the government, and an
often large and diverse group of parties or peripheral players, there is no
one simple solution. There are, however, many ways in which mediators
and mediation can assist the parties in dramatically reducing collective
suffering. Use of any of the techniques available, however, requires,
given the uncertainties inherent in most environmental fact patterns, that
the parties believe that they will be treated fairly in the process of
resolution, and that they have a sense that justice, or at least a rough
justice, will be the measure of a successful compromise among the parties.
A. Approaches to EnvironmentalDispute Resolution
Techniques that can be called upon to ease the pain of environmental
disputes include:
*

Getting the disputes out of the courts, or at least on "hold" while
negotiations continue.

*

Minimizing both individual and collective costs through cost
sharing.

*

Joint advocacy of and implementation of reasonable cleanup
standards to reduce overall costs.

*

Use of fair allocation frameworks that do not result in disparate
treatment of, or unfair effects on, some parties to the detriment
of some and the benefit of others.

•

Adjustment systems using alternative dispute resolution
procedures (mediation, appeal rights, arbitration) to revise initial
assessments of liability when new information is obtained.

*

Reduction of legal fees and other related "transaction" costs
associated with litigation.
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*

Joint addressing of peripheral problems, such as issues with
lenders and tenants, so as to take care of some problems that can
be addressed without expenditures.

*

Joint funding of technical support for research and preparation
of documentation to alleviate health risk concerns.

"

Avoiding intra-group battles of the experts.

"

Taking pains not to increase regulators' or the public's concern
about the site(s) in question.

"

Maintaining realistic expectations (i.e., eliminating expectations
of gold-plated cleanups) or windfalls in terms of damage
recoveries.

"

Sharing of experts and divisions of work among experts.

*

Dealing with fear through effective media relations, public
communication, employee education, and skilled and
trustworthy consultants.

B. Developing the Necessary Level of Confidence in the Process
Use of the above techniques depends, at least, on developing a
modicum of trust among the parties in terms of the process of the
approach used for resolution. Trust can be developed by working
together to determine a scheme for resolution that fosters belief in the
overall fairness of the approach to be used. Parties' perceptions of
fairness depend, in large part, upon acceptance of the process that is
established for resolution of the dispute. A process that engenders a
sense of fairness requires that the parties commit to certain ground rules
for arriving at goals and priorities, including:
*

Commitments to make all disclosures necessary for the group to
arrive at informed decisions about shares of responsibilities.

•

Equal access among the parties to information to assure that
necessary, essential disclosures have been made and all
information has been considered.

*

Group confidentiality to assure that disclosures are not used by
third parties against the group or individuals.
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*

Principled allocation
information.

*

Clear understandings of future responsibilities.

*

A system for follow-up and sanctions for non-performance.

frameworks

based

on

all

available

In order to commit to and implement ground rules, it is necessary for
the parties to have a method of reaching a consensus. Reaching a
consensus allows multiple parties to: (1) deal collectively with the
inevitable pervasive involvement and power of one or more layers of
government as a party and/or a decision-maker; (2) adjust as a group to
changes in the make up of the group itself; and, (3) reach solutions that
the group can live with in the future. Consensus and concerted action is
particularly important in environmental disputes because public
perception and controversy could have a significant effect on what must
be done, such as when an environmental cleanup is necessary.
Divisiveness among group members can greatly increase the groups'
overall cost and exposure. Consensus through mediation minimizes
costs by presenting a coordinated front and maximizing collective efforts
with respect to agencies and issues.
C. Consensus Building Means Going Slow to Go Fast
As Gandhi once pointed out, "There is more to life than increasing
its speed." 3 Consensus building takes time, but it avoids the nearly
inevitable upward spiral of unresolved conflict and the waste and
destruction of prolonged antagonism. Environmental disputes, not
resolved through a process of reaching consensus, become sharper, more
expensive, and more difficult to resolve. Such disputes squander
resources, cause distraction, and result in the loss of opportunities.
Without facilitation by a third party, reaching a consensus and
achieving resolution of a dispute is frustrating and often impossible. The
issues are far too complex, the numbers of parties too high, and
differences among parties too extreme. Further, the disputes are made
more severe due to the tactical difficulty and frequent counterproductivity of dealing piecemeal with the involved governmental
entities.

3

Louis E.

BOONE, QUOTABLE BusiNEss 302 (1992).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2000

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 2 [2000], Art. 3

372 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
1. Building Consensus: Principles
Consensus building is facilitated by attention to certain principles
that create a sense of fair play. At the very outset of the mediation
process, mediators should focus on establishing the following:
"

A belief that reaching a consensus is the optimum way of
addressing the concerns underlying the dispute.

"

An understanding that the consensus building process must be
inclusive, not exclusive. The involvement of all parties should
be sought, including not only those affected by the process or
outcome and those necessary to achieve a resolution, but also
those who could undermine or sabotage the process with a
significant interest. All such parties' participation should be
solicited, though not all need be present at every meeting or at
every stage.

*

An appreciation that a voluntary process creates incentives for
the parties to cooperate and be reasonable. The risk of alienating
a party to such an extent that they withdraw from the process,
splinter attention and delay or frustrate concerted effort is an
incentive to rational action and conduct. A conscious decision to
include all interests, because that is the way to maximize the
effectiveness of resolution, directs the parties' attention to
contributing their best efforts to achieving a resolution.

*

A recognition that there is no one answer to any given problem,
and that solutions must be designed to meet the group's specific
circumstances and needs.

"

An appreciation that flexibility is essential. It is not possible to
anticipate everything that might eventually happen at the outset
of a problem solving process. The process of reaching a
resolution and implementing the solution must remain available,
open, fair, and equitable. For some parties, this means that the
process will not proceed as quickly as they had hoped. Patience
is essential, and the mediator must take the lead in exhibiting
patience.

"

A commitment to providing all necessary information to all
involved parties. Parties vary in their levels of sophistication
and in their ability to mobilize resources. If all necessary parties
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are to be part of a settlement, weaker parties must have adequate
access to whatever necessary information is available to the
more powerful members of the group.
"

An appreciation of the inevitability and legitimacy of diverse
values and interests.

*

Confidence in the fact that trust and openness will move
participants beyond bargaining over positions to exploring
underlying interests, needs, and, eventually, options. Building
trust is largely dependent on confidence in the integrity and
competence of those who convene the mediation, particularly
the mediator. The mediator must assist participants in dealing
with setbacks, analyzing information, protecting important
interests, using clear and accurate statements, affirming group
successes, and avoiding or controlling rhetoric. The mediator
must also assure that the parties dedicate sufficient time for the
process to work.

*

Acceptance of the fact that accountability and follow-up must be
built into any solution. Accountability builds understanding
and commitment, minimizes surprises, and fosters trust.
Participants must be accountable not only to their constituents,
but also to the consensus building process.
Group
representatives must provide timely feedback and reporting not
only to their own constituents, but also to the group of
participants as a whole.

"

Time limits. Clear, realistic deadlines marshal resources, focus
efforts and mark progress.

*

A plan that must include implementation, support, and follow
up.
Implementation usually requires both government
acceptance and a way to deal with post agreement problems.
Implementation also requires identification of who is responsible
for what and when, a realistic timetable and funding for
agreements reached, and development of procedures for review,
revision and renegotiation.
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2. The Process of Consensus Building in Mediation
From a very practical standpoint, making consensus building work
in mediation requires:
That the parties develop a carefully articulated statement of
what worthwhile problem must be jointly solved.
At a
minimum, the statement should include the concept of
minimizing collective costs and maximizing efficiency in dealing
with any involved governmental agencies.
*

Motivation. Motivation arises most frequently as a result of a
crisis. Therefore, the high cost of the problem in terms of time
and money, potential unsatisfactory outcomes, and the
availability (or unavailability) of options must be emphasized.
In environmental disputes, the fact that the government will take
action, if the parties do not, is usually a strong motivator.

*

The ability to identify and document issues. A clear visible
agenda should be displayed at meetings and should be
discussed in a collaborative way, in advance, with key
participants. Are the items appropriate?
Is enough time
allocated for each? Have any issues been forgotten? Are they in
the right sequence? How much time for each item? The agenda
should be reviewed at the conclusion of the meeting, items
added, and items listed for revisitation when the group next
meets. Prior to the next meeting, the mediator should circulate
the agenda and request feedback.

*

That group discussions be kept focused, relevant, and
appropriately sequenced. Tactfully squelching digression into
war stories and injustice is helpful.

*

Use of effective communication techniques such as effective
listening, reflecting, periodic summarization, encouragement of
participation, and maintaining a positive tone.

*

Good record keeping. Recording major ideas and viewpoints
and creating a group memory to use for guidance, to refresh
recollections, and to test agreements is invaluable and essential
to the avoidance of a perception of chaos.

*

Using time between meetings.
This includes correcting
misperceptions, communicating new information, testing new
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ideas, arranging for technical assistance, and planning the next
meeting.
Involving constituents of representatives. Representatives must
keep their constituents informed; representatives of constituent
groups must be asked at every critical point, "Will your group
support that position?"
*

The ability to handle intense emotions in public. This may
require: contacting parties before a meeting to tell them what to
expect, listening to what someone needs to say in advance of the
meeting and suggesting different approaches, setting boundaries
by setting agendas; emphasizing that the meeting's success is
dependent on the parties' conduct, acknowledging feelings;
avoiding sensitive words; being willing to terminate the meeting
if necessary, and interrupting personal attacks.

"

Overcoming resistance to negotiations. Resistance stems from a
wide range of concerns: fear of exhibiting weakness, distrust so
severe that good faith agreements seem impossible, an attitude
that a party can win without negotiating, unfamiliarity with, and
the perceived risk of, the mediation process itself, availability of
other options, and fear of increasing the visibility of the dispute.
Resistance can be overcome by utilizing the strength of public
opinion within and outside of the group, explaining the
advantages of negotiation, making the inevitable costs and
disadvantages of other courses of action obvious, stressing the
unpredictability of adversarial processes, and insisting on
"trying one more meeting."

"

Keeping people at the table. Parties must be prepared for some
degree of frustration. Gains must be made explicit; the group
must be used for support and to keep negotiations alive; parties
must be aware of hidden obstacles; and the mediator must
enforce group mandated ground rules, let troublesome people
go, ask for replacements when necessary, and insist on "trying
one more meeting."

*

Breaking deadlocks.
This can be accomplished through:
bringing in an outside expert, treating obstacles as routine
problems thereby normalizing them, showing that there is a
"new ball game" where skepticism exists regarding prior
settlement efforts, reviewing past procedures and getting out of
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old roles and habits, getting the right people at the table,
breaking the problem into small pieces, brainstorming new
options, developing alternative proposals, asking parties to be
more specific, and insisting on "trying one more meeting."

0

That the parties use their time well. The mediator must have a
clear mandate from the group, prepare for meetings thoroughly
and establish a problem solving setting. "Using time well"
means that meetings should be conducted in a format that
facilitates collaborative action rather than free-flowing
discussion. Such use can include some meetings with all
participants or the meeting of subgroups, such as task forces or
committees. Whatever group structure is used, the members
should establish ground rules as well as protocols for attendance
at the group meetings, agreements as to confidentiality, and a
schedule of milestones or interim dates for progress or action.

3. Criteria for fair allocation systems
One particular technique, use of fair allocation systems, deserves
special, detailed attention. Criteria for successful allocations include
considerations of the following:
*

Advance consensus regarding what data is to be gathered and
the methods of collection for and purpose of that data.
Cooperating group members who are contributing funds for
information collection will likely not appreciate being the focus
of group-sponsored efforts to "prove up" additional damages on
funding parties.

"

Acceptable procedures regarding what the group will do about
the inevitable "gaps" in available data, such as missing years of
records and uncertainties as to quantities of waste or material.
For example, where there are years of evidence of facility use for
disposal by a particular party, then a gap in records, then years
more of facility use by the same party, does the group assume
that the party utilized the disposal facility during the years when
records are missing? At what level of use? How can the
assumption be overcome?

*

Agreement on initial allocations to fund immediately necessary
tasks, with agreement as to future reallocation and challenge
procedures.
Frequently, governmental demands will have
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deadlines for action which cannot await the group's arrival at
"final" allocations. Use of interim allocations to fund such
actions as "removals" can avoid civil penalties or exacerbation of
contamination, while still allowing adjustments to individual
allocations in the future, according to a process the group
decides upon.
*

The need for internal consistency, freedom from obvious errors,
use of all key information, soundness of working assumptions,
reasonable fairness and recognition of reality, such as the
possibility of unrecoverable shares. Funding of "orphan" shares
or the shares of "empty chairs" may require more in the way of
individual contributions than parties' true equitable share based
on some standard such as volume. Reaching funds to reimburse
the group for covering those shares is best served by concerted
action of the group.

4. Practical Allocation Approaches
Approaches which have been successfully used in environmental
cases to set both initial and final allocations among numerous parties
include combinations of the following:
*

Time on the subject of owning property or business.

•

Time operating the subject property or specific equipment.

*

Time engaged in certain activities on the property.

•

Level of business conducted with the pollution causing business.

*

Known spills or used quantities.

0

Known careless practices, or evidence of care.

*

Known polluting incidents.

*

Known chemical use or specific activities carried out on site.

*

Former site configurations, process diagrams, aerial photos.

*

Relative volumes of materials used.

*

Relative volumes of materials sent to the site.
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"

Relative toxicity of each party's materials.

*

Ability to prove that some damages are "severable," or
distinguishable from the rest (i.e., liquids versus asbestos waste).

"

The degree of cooperation of a party with regulators and the rest
of the group ("Premiums" demanded from late joiners?).

*

Contractual arrangements or circumstances which require
bringing in other parties to assume liability for some parties
(indemnities, assumptions of risk, statutory responsibility,
successors).

*

Consideration of land use restrictions on the part of present
owners as a concession to the group's cost control efforts.

*

Access to underground
insurance proceeds.

*

Assumptions of continuous use where a pattern of use has been
established.

*

Assumptions regarding the volume of material remaining in
"empty" containers.

*

Assumptions regarding the nature of materials disposed of,
spilled, or sent to a facility when records are missing.

"

Contributions by group members, such as where a municipality
allows disposal of site waste at a municipally owned disposal
facility at reduced tipping fees, as part of its "share", or where a
group member contributes certain types of work in exchange for
a reduction in share.

*

Agreement that the remediated facility will be sold and the
proceeds distributed among members according to some
agreement.
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5. Allocation Procedures
To arrive at an allocation approach, it is often useful to follow a
procedure to elicit potential approaches. Such a procedure can include
facets such as:
*

Each party preparing an "anonymous" list of factors considered
crucial to any consideration of allocation.

*

A subgroup, or the neutral, assembles a proposed approach,
which is then configured by the group.

*

A system of interim allocations, with a challenge process and
alternative dispute resolution procedure set by a subgroup or
neutral.

6. Structuring "Enforcement" Mechanisms
If parties are concerned about compliance with any agreement
reached, they will not seriously negotiate. Enforcement after mediation
is an important topic.
Enforcement often must be structured to include incentives for
compliance. Assessing penalties from group members in the event of
non-compliance, tied to a rebate in the absence of instances of noncompliance, helps keep risk down and incentives in place.
"Fallbacks" or contingency plans in the event of the occurrence of
contingencies are wise. Such contingency plans can include financial
assurance mechanisms, such as insurance or escrowed funds. Grievance
and arbitration procedures, as well as penalty clauses and court consent
to settlements, can also provide safeguards.
7. Tools
Tools utilized by mediators and parties in successful mediations
incorporating those techniques have included:
*

Cooperation and/or cost sharing agreements among parties.

*

Indemnities and releases.

"

Agreements regarding necessary actions in the future together
with enforcement.
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*

Tolling agreements, dismissals without prejudice.

"

Non-interference and confidentiality agreements.

*

"Horse trading" among parties.

*

Combining resources, sharing experts and costs.

"

Use of land use restrictions or covenants.

*

Assuring evaluation of all potential options.

*

Enlisting the aid of regulatory or other governmental agencies
and knowledgeable persons.

"

Understanding of and experience in implementation of
innovative government programs, such as pre-purchase
agreements and voluntary cleanup agreements.

"

Use of new insurance products to cover contingencies and future
risk.

"

Innovative approaches to reaching agency closure without delay.

D. Answers to the Question "Why Should I Participatein Consensus Building
Through Mediation?"
When considering starting or participating in consensus building, or
when attempting to convince parties to participate, the following
questions are often useful:
What reasons are there for a party to participate? Are there any
real reasons not to get involved? Often, parties cite warnings
from counsel about "free discovery" to be had by other parties in
the course of mediation as a reason not to participate. Mediation
does necessitate sharing of factual information. However, facts
are always discoverable anyway, and the issue with respect to
disclosure of involvement or on site conditions or prior use is
generally how the information will be supplied and at what cost,
not whether it will be supplied at all. Further, the exchange of
information "cuts both ways;" that is, all parties' counsel have
the same opportunities for "free discovery," all parties will
eventually have access to the same information, and all avoid the
expense of discovery to get it.
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*

What are the likely consequences of failing to reach a resolution
voluntarily?

*

What are the agencies likely to do, failing action from the
parties?
Where environmental agencies are involved, the
consequences of inaction are extreme -- fines and potential treble
damages for inaction, in some cases, plus the possibility of
exacerbation of conditions leading to additional costs or liability
if there is delay in reaching a resolution.

*

Can the subject of the dispute be addressed now? Often, there is
no way to avoid addressing the subject, since regulatory agency
demands cannot simply be ignored, without the possibility of
substantial additional damages or significant fines. If the subject
of the dispute must be addressed, why not choose the context
most likely to contribute to consensus?

*

Can progress be made? Because of the pervasive power of
governmental and regulatory agencies, progress must be made.
The question is how, and at what "transaction" cost.

"

Can major interests be identified? Often, the parties' major
interest is identical in light of the joint and several aspects of
environmental liability:
minimizing aggregate, as well as
individual, cost.

*

Are there representatives who can speak for the various
interests? Usually, concerted effort by a number of parties will
provide an incentive for others to designate representatives to
join the efforts to reach a consensus.

*

Are there special incentives for reaching agreements? Special
incentives are often provided by the potential actions of
regulatory agencies in the face of inaction by the parties, if not
by the parties' fundamental understanding of the situation
generally.

*

Can meaningful deadlines be established? Again, this issue can,
and will, be addressed by regulators, failing action by the
parties.

*

Are governmental decision-makers willing to be involved? It is
much more likely that governmental decision-makers will
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demonstrate interest in flexibility and a cooperative attitude if
parties have demonstrated their willingness to work together.
*

Can a viable process for reaching consensus be structured? If it
cannot be, then decisions as to future actions will be made by
others outside the parties' control, resulting in something like an
environmental dispute version of cutting off one's nose to spite
one's face.

*

Are there preliminary matters that need to be dealt with first?
Should existing lawsuits be put on hold pending outcome of
negotiations? Have some parties already expended significant
funds, and must those expenditures be addressed first?

"

Are there parallel activities that must be considered? Should the
group fund a health based risk assessment early on in the
process to facilitate a risk based solution? Should a public
participation system be immediately implemented?

*

Is another decision-making process more applicable or
desirable? If so, why? What interests will be served by utilizing
an adversarial process? There are few reasons for engaging in
litigation because, according to credible reports, ninety-six
percent of all cases settle anyway. The real questions are when
will the case settle and what level of cost will be incurred or can
be avoided in the process.

E. Overcoming Resistance to Consensus-BuildingMediation
Because consensus building through mediation offers so many
advantages, one of the questions mediators must ask themselves is why
is it not more frequently used to resolve environmental disputes? The
answer lies not in the unfamiliarity of counsel and parties with
mediation; but rather, with perceptions of an advantage to litigation
which is not perceived to exist in mediation. That advantage is the
theoretical availability, in litigation, of a "just" decision based on the
application of a rule of law. This theoretical (and illusory) advantage
often stands in the way of settlement, even when mediation is convened.
Parties sometimes believe that, if they go to court, they will win (or at
least dramatically reduce their damages) because they have "the law on
their side" or a very compelling factual case. In fact, though, consensus
building through mediation offers not only the same opportunity, but
also a more likely format to achieve a "just result," albeit in a slightly
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different and, it could be argued, more powerful format. Further,
technical arguments, which are often very difficult to effectively make in
a litigation context, can be effectively put forth in a mediation context. In
mediation, decision-makers (the parties themselves) have an opportunity
to directly question "experts," and the mediator has the option of
arranging for mutually acceptable shared experts to provide a technical
basis for decisions without the implication of partisan opinions from
experts for any one party.
The view that litigation is the gateway to a just result is a myth. As
every experienced litigator will attest, courts/juries do not inevitably
respond predictably and well to artful legal arguments. Court decisions
do not uniformly conform to established legal principles. Litigation by
no means guarantees a "just" result, or even one based strictly or even
substantially, on legal precedent or the facts. Regardless of how good
one's case appears to be, there is no such thing as predictability in
litigation. In addition to the possibility of losing completely and
sustaining catastrophic damages, parties may end up with a split
decision that puts them, after considerable expense and delay, in the
same or even a worse position than they would have been in if they had
settled.
The possibility of an unfavorable result in litigation is exacerbated by
the fact that advocates and parties suffer from two handicaps regarding
the case in which they are involved. The first of these is "advocate and
party optimism," which results from the natural tendency of parties and
their counsel to believe their case is better than it really is. The second is
"devaluation of offers," which results from parties' and their counsel's
devaluation of settlement proposals because they come from the "other
side."
Mediators must deal with the illusion of assured success as part of
the effort of moving toward settlement, as well as with the parties'
respective convictions and illusions regarding the strength of their cases
and the value of opposition-sponsored proposals. Neither issue can be
approached "head on," but rather must be dealt with in the course of the
mediation process itself. The mediation format, which allows private
caucuses with parties and counsel, furthers this end in ways that
litigation simply cannot equal.
With respect to the expectation of a "just" result based on the rule of
law strictly applied, mediators are able, privately, to make the point that
parties are much more likely to be able to count on a "just" (or at least a
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"roughly just") result in mediation. Mediators credibly take issue with
uncalled for optimism while maintaining neutrality by using questioning
techniques and observations to poke holes in both/every side of the case,
without making the parties or their counsel look bad or unreasonable.
Usually, focusing on the precise elements of each cause of action and on
the available evidence is enough to at least shake the confidence of
realistic or experienced litigators. A credible mediator forces the parties
to reevaluate their positions, without appearing to be forcing anything at
all.
The format of mediation allows each party (and the mediator) to
expose the other party or parties, as well as counsel, to another view of
the evidence and another potential interpretation and application of the
law. No matter how secure an advocate may be in his or her position
prior to mediation, other parties' views, their counsels' views, and the
mediator's views do matter and do make an impact. Listening to the
other "spins" on the case and the mediator's assessment and
commentary make a difference and, often, allow or persuade parties and
counsel to view the matter through "different eyes."
Because of the enhanced ability of counsel to make legal arguments
and elaborate at length and repeatedly on facts in mediation, counsel is
at least as important in mediation as in litigation. Counsel is able to
argue law and fact in a very focused but flexible context; counsel has
every opportunity for an informed discussion or review of various
aspects of the case, both in front of the parties and other counsel and
with the mediator privately. At least in this mediator's experience,
counsel's arguments have a great deal of force in mediation, and a
significant effect on the outcome, in terms of basing outcome on
applicable law. This is because the parties and their counsel are very
attentive, more so than a jury might be, to the strength of the other
party's legal arguments. In addition, the mediator is able to translate the
parties' arguments into a format that may be more persuasive and
effective than if the same argument came solely from the opposition.
An additional advantage for counsel is that, in mediation, counsel is
able, through the mediator, to make client(s) aware of weaknesses in
their case without counsel seeming to exhibit weakness or to lose faith in
their own arguments. In the event that mediation is unsuccessful, the
process itself usually convinces client(s) of the necessity of litigating
cases that do not settle. It becomes obvious, after a sincere effort to settle
through mediation with parties present, that every settlement effort has
been made, and there is no option other than a third party decision-
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maker. The certainty that litigation is necessary creates a better client
relationship and a greater understanding by a party who may well be
adversely affected by an adverse outcome in court.
F.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

We truly must all learn to live together as rational human beings, or
die together as fools. Mediating environmental disputes is evidence of,
and a way to benefit from, rational behavior. Environmental and public
policy disputes are frequently multi-party, fact and expert intensive and
often "high stakes" experiences. Both parties and their counsel will be
well served by use of the mediation process, which provides a much
more favorable "stage" for legal and equitable arguments than litigation
and a much safer approach to resolution than can ever be achieved in
court. There is little doubt that mediation use will continue to be an
optimum approach for many cases which are otherwise not resolvable
without tremendous investments of money and time.
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